Thomas R Ullmann
June 16, 2025
On June 1st, Karol Tadeusz Nawrocki won the Polish presidential election by
a razor-thin margin, securing a majority of 50.89 %, narrowly defeating the
moderate Rafał Trzaskowski.
This victory comes at a time when Poland’s economy continues to grow robustly, with a GDP per capita now comparable to Spain’s and projected to compete with the wealthiest EU nations within the next decade. However, since 2016, corruption in Poland has notably increased, driven by weakened judicial independence, expanded political control over state institutions, and misuse of public funds benefiting party-linked media and cronies, all developments occurring under the previous hard-line nationalist president, Andrzej Duda.
Consequently, many within the European community had hoped for a stabilising figure. With Poland’s prime minister being a committed Europhile, a similarly pro-EU president would have likely drawn Poland closer to Brussels during a critical juncture for European unity. It was not to be.
Although the president does not directly craft legislation, the office holds considerable veto power, potentially rendering ineffective any government and prime minister with whom the president disagrees.
In order to forecast the trajectory of Poland, a country of huge geographical and economical significance to the EU, and more widely Europe, one must ask: who is Karol Nawrocki?
Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s first millennial president, born at the tail end of communist rule in 1983 in Gdańsk. His father actively opposed communism, sowing the seed for the anti-communist zeal that is fundamental in understanding his mentality.
It cannot be understated what perspective he would have had on the downfall of communism, with Gdańsk the birthplace of Solidarity, the movement that rose up against the dictatorship. Moreover, it was at the dockyards that the movement garnered substantial support, with Karol’s father, a dockyard worker, himself joining the organisation. Thus, as an impressionable boy he was given front-row seats to the overthrow of communism.
Though it can be assumed that Catholicism was in the background of his childhood, with this being typical of the region, little is said of this as a defining feature.
Growing up in the 1990s Karol’s father went to the UK in order to find work, exemplifying the work ethic with which he identifies. As a keen sportsman Karol was known for his skills as a footballer and boxer, boxing competitively from 2000-2004.
Student-era publications by Nawrocki in the conservative monthly Arcana praised Poland’s NATO accession. He has since repeatedly signaled his support and belief in NATO. Despite having completed a bachelor’s degree in personnel-administration his attention was drawn towards the study of history, completing a doctorate with a thesis titled "Social Resistance to Communist Rule in the Elbląg Voivodeship, 1976-1989". He demonstrated an eye for historical accuracy, utilising mostly primary sources as the basis for his argumentation.
Karol’s love of fighting didn’t remain in the ring. He has himself admitted involvement in pre-planned illegal street brawls between football gangs. In May 2025, Nawrocki publicly acknowledged taking part in a “70 vs. 70” arranged fight—a pre-planned street brawl typical of football hooligan culture between supporters of Lechia Gdańsk and Lech Poznań in 2009, describing it as a “sporting, noble fight among men.” Despite not being himself arrested, others involved in the violence were.
A photo from his hooligan days
https://x.com/hooliganscz1999/status/1929521591269965903/photo/1
Despite only admitting to this single case, it is highly probable that he was ingrained into the culture, with him having the nickname “Doctor Knockout” suggesting regular involvement. Lechia’s culture has systematically far-right nationalist beliefs with strongly held xenophobic positions. At matches, various banners exemplify direct anti-EU, nationalist sentiment. Arguably this involvement in extremist culture is more significant than the violence itself.
There is also a stronger tie with religion among the scene’s culture than has been spoken of from his childhood suggesting this was defining of his movement towards becoming a more devout catholic. Lechia ultras frequently invoked God, honour, and nation. All these aspects of Karol’s current beliefs, honed into a polite narrative for the electorate, demonstrate how he was shaped by being embedded in the football hooligan culture.
Karol Nawrocki rose swiftly within Poland’s grouping of nationalist memory institutions. Appointed director of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk in April 2017, after the Ministry of Culture abruptly dismissed the founding team, he immediately signalled that the permanent exhibition would be "realigned" to foreground Polish heroism [1]. An overhaul followed. Panels on the Jedwabne pogrom, the Blue Police, and civilian complicity were either excised or relegated to footnotes, while new displays celebrated the Polish Underground State, Catholic resistance, and the post-war anti-communist insurgency. Critics inside the museum were moved to back-office roles, contracts with outside scholars were terminated, and the advisory board was reshaped around historians close to the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. Under Nawrocki the institution pivoted from reflective history centre to patriotic outreach hub, launching TikTok-friendly campaigns such as PolskaWalcząca and a travelling exhibit, Trail of Polish Victories, that toured provincial schools in 2020. Effectively the exhibits became a form of propaganda.
In July 2021 the government promoted him to President of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), entrusting him with both archival stewardship and prosecutorial powers under the 2016 “decommunization” law. Within eighteen months more than one hundred Soviet-era monuments were dismantled or hauled away, prompting the Russian Investigative Committee to issue a warrant for his arrest—a first for any Polish official since 1989.
Meanwhile grants for Holocaust research were trimmed, while new investigative resources flowed toward cases of communist-era abuses.
Taken together, Nawrocki’s record shows a consistent pattern, harnessing cultural institutions to write an unambiguous narrative of Polish heroics and moral singularity, even at the cost of scholarly pluralism and diplomatic friction. It is often not what is said but what isn’t.
Nawrocki’s campaign weaponised culture wars and Euroscepticism. He promised a unilateral exit from the EU Migration Pact ("I will terminate the EU’s migration pact") [2]. In a staged cultural performance, he shredded a copy of Gender Queer on camera—a symbolic act reflecting deep-seated social conservatism [3]. He framed the election as a “referendum on liberal Brussels policy,” directly casting Brussels as the enemy [4].
A second line of attack centred on Ukraine’s wartime aspirations. In a televised interview on 8 January 2025 he argued that Kyiv must “answer for the brutal crime against 120 000 Poles in Volhynia” before joining either the EU or NATO, adding that “a state unable to settle its historical accounts cannot claim the privileges of full European membership.” [5] Kyiv’s foreign ministry condemned the remark as “biased and manipulative,” but the episode signalled how Nawrocki is prepared to fuse memory politics with foreign-policy leverage, keeping both Brussels and Kyiv guessing how far he might go once in office. In other instances Nawrocki has suggested that there is no path to membership of either organisation, showing how elusive his actual position can be.
Although Nawrocki’s polished social-media persona emphasises diplomacy, subtle signals reveal a deeper agenda and manipulative character. Here are some examples of Nawrocki’s underlying politics through his use of Twitter, including with members of the Romanian far- right with genuine neo-Nazi tendencies, Ukraine-scepticism and ambiguity, and other signals of political posturing.
This pointed remark reflects a deep alignment with the nationalist narrative promoted by the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS). The quote suggests a readiness to dismiss critics as politically or ideologically motivated and frames opposition to state-directed historical projects as unpatriotic. Clearly he has little tolerance for dissenting perspectives in public commemorations. The nationalist narrative wishes to deny the importance of Polish collaborators with the Nazis, including in the Holocaust, putting pressure on museums to shy away from historical accuracy.
Likely referring to migrants who were returned to Poland from Germany. Far from a flood, this is orders of magnitude less than that coming across either the Ukraine or Belarus border. No tweets appear discussing the Belarus problem. This is suggestive of finding an excuse to have friction with Germany to suit a Eurosceptic agenda.
Simion travelled to Poland to appear at a Nawrocki campaign rally in Zabrze, signalling
cross-border nationalist collaboration.
Background on Simion: Founder of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). Rose to prominence through the Action 2012 movement for Romanian-Moldovan unification. Opposes same-sex marriage, Covid restrictions, mandatory vaccination, and deeper EU integration, somewhat ideologically aligned with Giorgia Meloni, Donald Trump, and Poland’s PiS, though he has questioned the Romani community’s place in Romania, exemplifying extremes of xenophobia. There are multiple examples of strong Simion–Nawrocki relations.
He praised Viktor Orbán as “a very effective politician” and said Polish-Hungarian co- operation is “essential for the growth and security of the region.” Only Hungary and Slovakia are so staunchly opposed to Ukraine joining the EU. Orbán is infamous for stalling support getting to Ukraine. Interestingly, in other tweets he hinted to the Serbian prime minister at Serbia’s future membership despite the suppression of the press in Serbia, suggesting pro-Serbia/anti-Ukraine bias.
This quote may suggest the motivation behind Nawrocki’s apparent resentment towards Ukraine. Despite the numbers of victims being disputed, the intent to ethnically cleanse by Ukrainian nationalists is not debated by historians which defines the Volhynia Massacre. Nevertheless, resentment driven by historical events doesn’t suggest a promising discourse in light of Ukraine recognising the massacre.
These communications underscore a dual strategy: publicly affirm alliances, but subtly propagate nationalist, exclusionary attitudes cloaked in diplomatic language. Nawrocki clearly understands the importance of optics.
Based on the aforementioned history, we can estimate the direction of governance. There are clear similarities with Viktor Orbán of Hungary, though Nawrocki has been consistently anti-Russia, a stance rooted in his upbringing. To add to this, it should be mentioned that Nawrocki tweeted on February 25th, 2022 passionate support for Ukraine’s fight for survival. Orban’s position was comparably tepid.
Alas, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Orbán himself was at some point substantially Russia-sceptic, though there is little basis to suggest that Nawrocki is capable of changing his stance eastwards quite in the way that Orbán did.
As such, a better comparison may be with Giorgia Meloni, prime minister of Italy. Despite her Euroscepticism and an appeal to nationalism she has been a supporter of Ukraine and has developed a rapport with various EU leaders. This is in stark contrast with Orbán, who remains mostly isolated among EU leaders.
Karol Nawrocki, candidate for Poland's right-wing Law and Justice (PiS)
party, addresses supporters at an election night event at the Mala Warszawa
Theatre in Warsaw, Poland, on June 1, 2025.WOJTEK RADWANSKI/AFP via Getty
Images
One key difference between Meloni and Nawrocki, which pushes him back toward the Orbán position, is that Meloni has suggested a NATO Article 5-like defence of Ukraine, whilst Nawrocki has rarely shown compromise to his position that Ukraine should not be a NATO member. Hence, though he may appear closer to Meloni’s position, he is nevertheless somewhere between the Meloni-Orbán extrema of European hard-line nationalists when it comes to Ukraine.
While military aid to Ukraine may continue, political opposition to Ukraine’s EU/NATO membership will persist, straining Warsaw-Kyiv relations.
In Europe, friction with Brussels is likely, as Nawrocki consolidates his role as a Visegrád-style sovereign nationalist. We can expect frequent use of veto power to stall pro-EU reforms on the judiciary, climate policy, and migration, jeopardising his own government’s ability to legislate until the likely replacement of Donald Tusk, the prime minister. Tusk survived a vote of confidence on June 11th, 2025 and thus is likely to be in situ for the foreseeable future.
Nawrocki will continue culture-war tactics, legislating against abortion rights, banning LGBTQ protections, and promoting Christian symbols in public life-to mobilise his social base at the expense of liberal pluralism [7].
Additionally, he will strengthen institutions like IPN to reinforce a nationalist historical narrative. He has already downplayed Poland’s role in Holocaust memory, and as president he’s likely to suppress acknowledgement of Polish complicity under the guise of defending national dignity [8]. If a future Polish government aligns with Nawrocki and pushes through undemocratic reforms it should be expected that EU funds will be withheld. This could push him towards Orbán.
Despite Nawrocki’s average reputation as an orator, he demonstrates a sharp eye for optics and sloganeering. Nawrocki’s social media presence shows ignorance of the modern media landscape. How far he will go in pursuit of his hard-line nationalist agenda is difficult to gauge. He appears capable of packaging extremist views in palatable forms for media consumption.
If a government broadly sympathetic to him takes shape, Poland could become an unpredictable veto-player, willing to trade support for EU budgets or Ukraine aid against concessions on migration, cultural policy, or Brussels’ rule-of-law mechanisms. None of those levers guarantees success, but the mere readiness to pull them would inject fresh uncertainty into both the EU project and Kyiv’s war-time calculus, forcing partners to weigh every deal against the possibility of Warsaw’s ability to blackmail.
Whether the European project can survive multiple actors with these disingenuous intentions has yet to be seen.
References
[1] Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. “Zmiany w Muzeum II Wojny Światowej,” 13 April 2017.
[2] K. Nawrocki, campaign video, 22 April 2025.
[3] TVP Info . “Nawrocki shreds Gender Queer,” 3 May 2025.
[4] Wprost . Interview with K. Nawrocki, 14 May 2025.
[5] Polsat News . Televised interview with K. Nawrocki, 8 January 2025.
[6] Financial Times. “Poland’s Donald Tusk survives no-confidence vote,” 12 Jun 2025.
[7] Gazeta Wyborcza. “Nawrocki signals new culture laws,” 20 Jun 2025.
[8] Haaretz. “Polish IPN cuts Holocaust grants,” 4 Aug 2024.