Brutal Overnight Attacks on Ukraine and the Looming Russian Summer Offensive
Thomas R Ullmann
May 25, 2025
Last night witnessed one of the heaviest combined drone–missile barrages since February 2024. A salvo of fourteen Iskander–M ballistic missiles and roughly 250 Shahed drones swept across Ukraine, most of them aimed at Kyiv. Ukrainian air–defence crews intercepted fewer than half of the missiles, but neutralised more than two–thirds of the drones, with many others forced down by electronic warfare. [9, 10]
Although the capital remained the primary target, alerts covered seven regions. One woman was killed near Kozacha Lopan in Kharkiv Oblast and fifteen civilians were injured in Kyiv as debris ignited apartment blocks. Power outages rippled through Odesa and Sumy after sub–stations were disabled by falling fragments. [9, 11]
This spring has seen a steady rise in paired drone–missile raids intended to saturate Ukrainian air defences; with clear skies forecast, officials warn of repeat attacks and have renewed demands for additional Western interceptors. [19]
A building in Kyiv damaged by a Russian overnight attack on May 25, 2025.
(State Emergency Service / Telegram)
The 2025 May front-line
The US–brokered April moratorium on strikes against each other’s power infrastructure has effectively collapsed, and the land war has reverted to attritional routines. On the Donetsk axis, Russian assault detachments inch west from their Pokrovsk salient behind daily glide– bomb strikes, yet gains rarely exceed 300–500 metres per week. [12] Meanwhile, repeated river–crossing attempts at the Dnipro estuary continue to fail, despite battalion–sized operations mounted almost weekly. [13]
Ukrainian forces are practising so–called “elastic defence”: they fall back from untenable positions, counter–attack with first–person–view drones, and rely on satellite–fed fire–control grids to attrite Russian armour. [14] Kyiv has also widened the contest by authorising cross– border raids and precision strikes on ammunition depots in Belgorod and Grayvoron, sowing confusion and forcing Moscow to disperse air–defence assets. [15]
Satellite imagery released in late May shows Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) density around Pokrovsk hovering at roughly fifty percent of peak February levels, suggesting manpower rotation fatigue. [11] Conversely, Ukrainian engineers have completed the first belt of a concrete “dragon’s teeth” line west of the town, indicating that Kyiv expects to conduct a protracted, defence-in-depth campaign rather than immediate counter-offensives. [12]
Potential summer offensive
The Royal United Services Institute notes that Kremlin recruitment has consistently overshot monthly targets since last autumn, allowing Moscow to reconstitute three under–strength divisions east of the Pokrovsk sector. [16] Yet the same report forecasts a shortage of 152 mm artillery shells by the end of 2025 unless China or North Korea expand deliveries. [17]
Ukrainian manpower remains stretched; the average age of front–line infantry has risen to forty-one, and brigade rotations have lengthened from five to eight weeks. [18] Nevertheless, Kyiv’s doctrine of “high-tech endurance”-melding FPV drones, precision artillery and Western real-time intelligence has blunted recent Russian thrusts. [19]
Western and Ukrainian intelligence converge on a most–likely Russian operational design: a concentric push that seeks to envelop Pokrovsk while staging diversionary pressure in northern Kharkiv to fix reserves. [20, 12] Analysts caution, however, that Russia’s offensive potential will crest by late summer as trained infantry pools deplete and glide–bomb stockpiles erode faster than production. [21]
Echoes of World War I, how Ukraine can win
Currently around 8% of Russian GDP supports the war, while defence and security already consume over 40% of federal expenditure—the highest share since the Soviet collapse. [18, 21] Rail–freight volumes are 7% lower year–on–year, signalling a cooling war–driven boom, and analysts argue that a $30–per–barrel oil–price cap could shave 40% off Kremlin export revenue. [18]
Parallels with Imperial Germany are unavoidable: despite occupying swathes of Belgium and France in 1916–18, Berlin succumbed with average war outlays at 42% of GDP and the home front imploded with civil unrest. For Russia to meet a similar fate without territorial collapse, sanctions will have to bite deeper than at present.
History never repeats itself perfectly. China added a wild-card absent in 1918; Beijing can backfill hardware and finance, yet remains cautious of secondary sanctions.
Hence the support of Ukraine must be three pronged. Firstly, China must be both shown the stick ,and offered the carrot, a blend of incentives and penalties. Trade with China must be maintained in order to have leverage in order to prevent further military chinese aid reaching Russia. Secondly, Ukraine must get continued support in order to hold the front-line, both lethal and non-lethal aid, including secured access to intelligence in order to operate its long range capabilities. Delays can no longer be a feature of this war. Thirdly, sanctions must act deeper and more broadly than seen thus far. Russian oil refined in India and shipped to Europe must cease.
Ukraine is western democracy’s eastern flank and thus must be supported if our democracies are to be secured. The sacrifices of Ukrainian service men and women need not be in vain.
Ukrainian sailors, Odesa, before the war. Taken by Thomas R
Ullmann, 2017
References
[1] S. Jones, J. Henley and J. Krupa, “Runoffs, reruns and rightwingers: Europe prepares for electoral ‘super Sunday’”, The Guardian, 14 May 2025. Online: accessed 17 May 2025.
[2] M. Maciag, C. Sevgili and J. Kotowska, “Poland election: what you need to know”, Reuters, 16 May 2025.
[3] “Presidential candidate reports far right rival to prosecutors for antisemitic remarks during TV debate”, Notes from Poland, 29 April 2025.
[4] “Ukrainian refugees ’collateral’ in Polish presidential election”, The Times, 14 May 2025.
[5] J. Henley and A. Popoviciu, “‘Between a mathematician and a Trump Loving hooligan’: Romania’s stark presidential choice”, The Guardian, 17 May 2025.
[6] V. Olari, “How proKremlin networks shaped Romania’s 2025 election”, DFRLab, 16 May 2025.
[7] Reuters Staff, “Portugal’s election: what are the parties running on Sunday?”, 15 May 2025.
[8] A. HernándezMorales, “How to watch Portugal’s election like a pro”, Politico Europe, 16 May 2025.
[9] Max Hunder, “Ukraine says 15 people hurt in ’massive’ Russian attack on capital”, Reuters, 24 May 2025. Online: accessed 25 May 2025.
[10] Kyiv Independent Staff, “Russia hits Kyiv with drones, missiles hours after prisoner exchange”, The Kyiv Independent, 24 May 2025.
[11] UK Ministry of Defence, “Intelligence Update – 21 May 2025”, gov.uk, 21 May 2025.
[12] Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 24 May 2025”, understandingwar.org, 24 May 2025.
[13] Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine repels fresh Russian river raids near Kherson”, Reuters, 12 May 2025.
[14] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Elastic Defence: How Ukraine Holds the Line”, RUSI Commentary, 2 May 2025.
[15] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, “Operational Update – 25 May 2025”, mil.gov.ua, 25 May 2025.
[16] Jack Watling, “Russian Recruitment Trends and Battlefield Implications”, RUSI Briefing, 15 April 2025.
[17] Mark Cancian, “Russia’s Ammunition Balance: Why Shells Still Matter”, CSIS, 10 May 2025.
[18] Max Seddon, “Russia’s new budget is a blueprint for war, despite the cost”, Financial Times, 18 Nov 2024.
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[19] NATO, “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte”, 25 April 2025.
[20] Dan Peleschuk, “Russia will strike in unexpected places this summer, Ukraine says”, Reuters, 23 April 2024.
[21] Bloomberg News, “NATO sketches plan for 5% GDP defence spending target”, 14 May 2025.